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Must we vote for the common good?  This isn’t an easy question to answer, in part because 
there is so little literature on the ethics of voting and, such as there is, it tends to assume 
without argument that we must vote for the common good.  Indeed, contemporary political 
philosophers appear to agree that we should vote for the common good even when they 
disagree about seemingly related matters, such as whether we should be legally required to 
vote, whether we are entitled to vote secretly rather than openly, or what form of democracy 
is most morally desirable.1 Such agreement is puzzling, then, given the extensive 
disagreements that surround it.  Hence, the aim of this paper is to consider whether the only 
morally correct way to vote is to vote for the common good. My hope is that even those who 
are not persuaded by the answers that I can offer at the moment, will find that the question 
is less easy to answer than they may have thought, and that the ethics of voting merits more 
sustained attention than it has received thus far. 
         ------------------------------------- 
Most of us suppose that people are ethically bound to vote for the candidate who will best 
advance the common good of citizens – at least in national elections in democratic states – 
because voting for those who will govern us helps to define the type of society that we are, 
and can fundamentally affect the lives of our fellow citizens.  It is wrong to vote without due 
consideration for those who may have to acknowledge as theirs the government that results 
from our choice.2 Voting in national elections means helping to choose the government that 
                                                          
1 It is noteworthy that this agreement seems to apply whether the authors are working in what is called ‘ideal’ 
or ‘non-ideal’ theory. Specifically, Jason Brennan, Lisa Hill and Brennan and Pettit all assume that we are in 
non-ideal circumstances, where voters are likely to vote selfishly or carelessly unless prevented from doing so. 
Yet they all insist that we have a duty to vote for the common good if we vote, although Jason Brennan and Hill 
disagree on whether we are morally required to vote, and Brennan and Pettit believe that we are morally 
required to vote openly, not secretly.  For the differences between ideal and non-ideal theory see  John Rawls, 
Political Liberalism (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1993.).p. 285. provides a rare discussion of the 
idea that we should vote for the common good in ch. 5, 119-124, but because the only alternative he presents 
to voting for the common good is voting in a purely egoistic manner, the discussion is fairly superficial. Lisa Hill, 
‘On the Justifiability of Compulsory Voting: Reply to Lever’, British Journal of Political Science 40 (2010): 917–
23. Geoffrey Brennan and Philip Pettit, ‘Unveiling the Vote’, British Journal of Political Science 20, no. 32 
(1990): 311–33. 
2 Joshua Cohen treats what I would call ‘the authorisation aspect’ of democratic government as fundamental, 
compared to other aspects, such as its ability to affect our interests.  This aspect of democratic government is 
also critical to Eric Beerbohm’s interesting book. Joshua Cohen, ‘Procedure and Substance in Deliberative 
Democracy’, in Philosophy, Politics, Democracy: Selected Essays (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 
2009), 154–80., especially 154-5. Beerbohm, Eric, In Our Name: The Ethics of Democracy (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 2012.). As Cohen and Sabel say, in their joint essay, ‘directly-deliberative 
polyarchy’, footnote 13 – ‘A common rationale for democracy is that it treats people as equals by giving equal 
consideration to their interests….  We avoid this rationale because we do not find the idea of equal 
consideration of interests normatively plausible’.  Joshua Cohen and Charles Sabel, ‘Directly Deliberative 
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will represent our country to the world and that will legally commit us, as citizens, at home 
and abroad.  So even if our electoral choice has no other consequences for our fellow citizens, 
these features of national elections are enough to make the ethics of voting a morally weighty 
matter.  Specifically, given the ways that elections bind citizens, it seems that we should vote 
in ways that reflect our interests in the legitimacy of the government that will act in our name, 
and will claim to represent our freedom, equality and happiness. 3 
 Nonetheless, there is something puzzling about the idea that there should be one and only 
one ethically correct approach to our choice as voters when, in all other aspects of life, acting 
ethically requires us to decide amongst competing ethical criteria - to consider the competing 
claims of friends and strangers, for example, or of parents and children; of global justice and 
domestic justice, or of justice to present and future generations.  If the only morally correct 
way to vote is to vote for the common good, the sole legitimate cause of ethical disagreement 
as voters would be how best to define and pursue the ends that we have in common.  Given 
reasonable pluralism, we can expect substantial disagreement about these matters.4 Still, this 
picture of the ethics of voting seems too simple – in part because it strips out so much of the 
ethical content we might expect voting to have, such as issues of the relative weight we 
should attach to our shared good as citizens. While the common good of our fellow citizens 
is important, can this be the only thing that we have to think about in order to know what we 
should do as voters, and is it really plausible that our shared good is always more important 
ethically than other considerations – at least when it comes to voting?    
In order to concentrate the paper on the question that concerns us, I will abstract from doubts 
about whether societies can have a common good.5  Instead, I will assume that there is 
nothing particularly obscure about the idea that large numbers of people might have 
normatively compelling interests in common – interests in peace, physical security, in 
freedom, equality, well-being, respect, happiness and the like – even if it can be difficult to 
provide any very determinative content for those interests, and efforts to go beyond 
abstractions tend to generate reasonable disagreement amongst citizens. I will also assume 
that our common good cannot be reduced to what we happen to agree on or to desire at the 
moment – that what we are concerned with is an ethically compelling account of our shared 
                                                          
Polyarchy’ in European Law Journal, 3.4, (1997) 313-342. Available free online at 
http://www2.law.columbia.edu/sabel/papers/DIRECTLY-DELIBERATIVE%20POLYARCHY.pdf 
 
3 For a discussion of the common good in the context of an interpretation of Rousseau, see Joshua Cohen, 
Rousseau: A Free Community of Equals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.). especially pp. 44 -50    
4 On reasonable pluralism see Joshua Cohen, ‘Moral Pluralism and Political Consensus’, in The Idea of 
Democracy, ed. David Copp, Jean Hampton, and John E. Roemer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1993). 
  
5 William Riker, Liberalism Against Populism maintains that social choice theory shows that the idea of a 
common interest is incoherent, and that the idea of a general will must depend upon a populist ideal of groups 
as united by a single will.  For the difficulties with Riker’s views see Joshua Cohen, ‘An Epistemic Conception of 
Democracy’, originally published in Ethics 97.1, (1986) 26-38.  
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interests, rather than the interests that we happen to share at the moment, or that we can 
currently agree that we share.  Considerations of justice, as well as other ethical 
considerations, therefore form part of our understanding of what we have in common and of 
what we should pursue collectively as citizens.   
I will refer, at various points, to interests which are legitimate but not shared.  By this, I mean 
interests which are consistent with the freedom and equality of others, but which are, at least 
at present, objects of reasonable disagreement.6  Examples of interests which are legitimate, 
but not shared, are interests in practising a particular type of religion, tolerant of others and 
accepting of democratic government, or interests in marrying a particular person, with their 
free and informed consent.  By contrast, interests in acting according to one’s conscience are 
interests which will be legitimate and shared, if our different conscientious convictions are 
shared and consistent with the freedom and equality of others.  Likewise, interests in physical 
security may be widely shared and legitimate, although some of our interests in security may 
be rather specific, give our hobbies or professions.  I assume that, even if consistent with the 
legitimate claims of others, these would be instances of personal, rather than common, 
interests. Interests which are illegitimate – however widely shared – are interests in 
domination, in coercion and exploitation, all of which may advance our particular interests as 
individuals and as members of diverse social groups, but which cannot be squared with a 
commitment to the freedom and equality of others, nor with democratic government as the 
political expression of that commitment.   
Unfortunately, we sometimes confuse legitimate and illegitimate interests, because we make 
factual mistakes about what will, indeed, advance people’s freedom and equality, or we make 
normative mistakes – for example, about the differences between democratic and 
undemocratic government.  In particular, we sometimes confuse reasonable disagreement 
with the expression of preferences, whether reasonable or not, or with dogmatic insistence 
on one’s favoured alternative, or with indifference to the truth of one’s beliefs.  By contrast, 
I assume that reasonable disagreement concerns disagreement about matters of fact, value 
and interpretation which reflect beliefs that are logically consistent, fit with the best available 
evidence on the matter at hand, and are compatible with a willingness to treat others as free 
and equal.  Logic and the best available evidence are often insufficient to decide amongst 
competing claims of fact, interpretations of ideas or claims about what is valuable.   So, 
interests that are legitimate but not widely shared generally reflect reasonable disagreement 
about how best to live, or what to do as individuals and as a society.  
 
 
                                                          
6 My conception of interests which are legitimate, but not shared, is therefore broader than Rawls’ idea of 
reasonable comprehensive conceptions of the good, though inspired by it.  See Political Liberalism, Lecture 2, 
section 3. 
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Justice, Voting and the Common Good 
People need to have some ends in common for us to attribute a ‘common good’ or ‘collective 
interest’ to them.   This agreement must be explicit, if the ends that people have in common 
are to form the deliberate objects of collective action and to order their judgements, and 
shape their motivations.  Moreover, if the common good is to explain and justify the ethics of 
any decision – whether to the individuals concerned or to other people – this agreement must 
have ethically significant content and be constrained in ways that reflects ends which people 
are morally entitled to pursue collectively as well as individually.  At least some of these 
ethical considerations will be considerations of justice – or of what members are entitled to 
expect of each other and of the basic institutions of their society – though their shared good 
need not be limited to questions of justice, or to principles of social justice in particular.  
Assume, then, that we live in a society with a shared conception of the common good - shared 
interests in physical security and freedom, for example.  These shared interests give us some 
interests in international justice, not just justice within our borders, and some interests in 
protecting the environment, both natural and cultural. This is partly because global justice, 
and the protection of our natural and built environment affect our security and freedom as a 
society.  More strongly, however, we accept that the principles of justice that should govern 
our society mean that other people and other societies are entitled to enjoy freedom and 
physical security too, so long as they do not aggress or injure others.  And so, a logical 
entailment of our shared conception of the good would be that we have duties of justice to 
non-citizens living in distant lands, as well as to those who will be citizens of our society in the 
future. It therefore seems that we are in the fortunate situation where we can pursue our 
common interest as citizens without worrying that this will bring us into conflict with the 
legitimate claims of others.  Put simply, it looks as though voting for what best advances our 
common good is consistent with the duties of justice that we owe to others – at least in ideal 
theory.7 
If we can vote to advance the common good without injustice, does it follow that under duly 
idealised conditions we have a duty to vote only on considerations of the common good?  The 
answer, I think, is ‘no’.  First, there is no reason to assume that elections under ideal 
circumstances inevitably – or, even, usually – result in at least one candidate being obviously 
better than the others from the perspective of the common good, however we define the 
latter.  For example, although we are in a society with a clear common good and competing 
political parties seeking to provide the best interpretation of that good, the alternatives 
before us may strike us as equally compelling – and for good reason.  Granted, some parties 
may be stronger on some points than on others, or have a more credible idea about how to 
                                                          
7 For Rousseau, justice and interest always agree, so long as citizens are willing to impose on others only those 
constraints on their liberty which they accept for themselves. This is not a purely formal requirement, as 
Cohen emphasises, because ‘the common good needs to be interpreted against the background of the 
fundamental commitment to treat associates as equals’, Rousseau, p. 43 
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advance one particular aspect of our shared interests.  But then, they may be less good in 
other ways – we may be unsure how realistic their economic or political assumptions are, or 
if they are psychologically plausible. And so, even abstracting from issues of enforcement and 
assuming that people are genuinely motivated to pursue the common good, it would be 
wrong to assume that a concern for the common good always gives us a determinate answer 
to the question ‘how should I vote?’.  
 In such cases, a concern for the common good might give us no definite reason to favour one 
candidate over others.  If we are to have reason to vote, therefore, we must be morally 
entitled to treat some consideration other than our common good as dispositive of our 
electoral choice.  Fortunately, we will almost certainly not lack for ethical considerations 
which we might use as tie-breakers, because while principles of justice that we share may not 
be sufficient to discriminate amongst the candidates, there may be important principles of 
justice on which, as a society, we do not have unanimity and, of course, there are many 
important ethical considerations which are not principles of justice at all. There are ethical 
ideals – of world peace and harmony or of happiness and wellbeing which may be ethically 
compelling even if our society is far from unanimous on their importance.  So, while not part 
of our common good, as we currently understand it, these are reasons for action which are 
capable of being accepted by others who see themselves as our equals.  It seems ethically 
permissible to look to these other ethical considerations as tie-breakers, if we are unable to 
decide amongst electoral candidates based upon our shared interests.   
Indeed, if candidates are equally good from the perspective of our shared interests, it seems 
permissible to decide in favour of one of them based on their consequences for our personal 
interests, because candidates may have different consequences for our ability to advance that 
part of the common good which concerns our personal interests. We would therefore have 
based our vote on considerations of the common good as far as we were able, but our vote 
would, nonetheless, have reflected other factors too - though ones consistent with 
maximising our shared ends.  
For example, we may believe that one candidate rather than another has a deeper 
commitment to peace, though both are equally good from the perspective of our shared 
interests, because one of the candidates is a pacifist and therefore holds an approach to peace 
which, while ‘sectarian’ and ‘unworldly’, as Rawls put it,8 may strike us as a tie-breaker when 
we compare the best candidates based on something that is of ultimate importance to us – 
world peace.  Or suppose that two candidates are equally good from the perspective of the 
common good, but that the consequence of their economic plans differ for our interests in 
university education.  Because both candidates are consistent with my legitimate interests, 
they both have policies which treat my interests in university education fairly.  I have no 
complaints on that score.  However, one of them has policies for funding access to universities 
which will cost me less than the other.  If the candidates are otherwise tied on my best 
                                                          
8 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1972). section 58.  
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understanding of the common good (because one is better at some things, but worse on 
others, or because I am not sure that I believe the proposals can really be implemented, much 
as I like them), it seems permissible to use the different consequences of their policies for my 
access to university as a tie-breaker.  The common good is consistent with me paying a variety 
of different prices for my university education; just as it is consistent with a variety of different 
outlooks on peace.  However, some of these advantage me more than others without 
implying injustice to other people, according to the principles of justice that we explicitly 
share.  My suggestion is that where all else is equal, it must be ethically acceptable to use 
these differences as a tie-breaker.  
Maximising v. Satisficing the Common Good 
It looks, then, as though in ideal theory we can imagine voting based on considerations other 
than the common good.  But the cases that we have just looked at are highly particular, even 
if they might occur quite frequently, and the permission to vote on factors other than the 
common good that they imply is highly constrained.  Specifically, it amounts to the 
supposition that we are allowed to treat other ethical factors as determinative of our vote in 
cases where we would otherwise have to decide a tie at random, or lack ethically significant 
reasons to vote at all. But do we have reasons to think that it is only in such circumstances 
that it would be ethically acceptable to vote on considerations which are not widely shared?  
Again, I think the answer must be ‘no’.  A commitment to pursue the common good of our 
fellow citizens does not entail a duty to maximise that good, or to suppose that the pursuit of 
our common ends is more important morally or politically than everything else.  If, on the one 
hand, the justification for government is that it enables us to pursue together ends that we 
could not pursue separately, it hardly follows that we judge the pursuit of these joint ends 
more important than other things.  Recognising this, we accept that the use of coercive power 
must be justified in ways that we can all accept and that, as a general matter, this makes it 
wrong to give priority to our personal objectives – however idealistic and altruistic – when 
determining who will exercise political power and why.  Seeing each other as equal partners 
in a voluntary cooperative enterprise means that I cannot co-opt others without their consent 
for my own ends.  But it does not follow that I must therefore maximise rather than satisfice 
our common good, or do so in all circumstances.  
Imagine that we are members of a society with a shared conception of the common good that 
we actively seek to promote.  We face an election with a variety of different candidates, all of 
whom are adequate from the perspective of the common good, and some of whom are better 
than adequate. However, in addition to reasonable disagreement about which candidates are 
best, looked at solely from the perspective of our shared interests, we also have reasons to 
rank the candidates quite differently based on legitimate interests which we do not share.  
That is because we all have a variety of personal interests which are consistent with treating 
others as equal citizens and valuing their freedom and wellbeing even though others do not 
share them.  At least some of these personal interests are of great ethical importance to us. 
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Thus, in addition to our shared ends, some of us hold personal ends which require us to strive 
for the greatest good of the greatest number of people, others amongst us believe that 
service to god is of the greatest ultimate importance, and others that it is of the utmost 
importance to secure natural diversity for future generations, or to preserve great works of 
art and to make them widely accessible. 
As a general matter, our different personal objectives give us no reason not to vote for the 
candidate/s we each judge best according to our conceptions of the common good, because 
there is sufficient overlap between what is best for us all and our most important personal 
commitments.  However, occasionally that is not the case. The question, then, is what, if 
anything, follows for the ethics of voting from the fact that our most important personal 
commitments may be at odds with the ends that we share as citizens? 
Imagine that the preservation of some especially beautiful artistic or archaeological site in a 
poor country abroad is more vulnerable than anyone had thought.  Urgent and expensive 
action is needed to protect it.  Some candidates openly argue that we should take this action 
(along with people in other countries), even if it means that we will have to put off other 
projects that we had wanted to pursue, and which were clearly relevant to the advancement 
of our shared interests.  Other candidates disagree, because they are unpersuaded that the 
best interpretation of our shared interests includes protecting the site, special though it is.  
That is the position of the candidate you think most likely to advance the common good.  You 
therefore agree with the candidate that saving the site may not be the best way to use 
collective resources if all we consider are our shared interests.  But you are not persuaded 
that this is the only thing that we should consider, in the circumstances. You are aware that 
you face an ethical dilemma – but are comforted by the fact that all of the candidates are 
clearly adequate from the perspective of the common good.  And so you decide to vote for 
the candidate who, out of those who are best from the perspective of the common good, is 
also willing to protect the site.  You accept that if this is to be an ethically acceptable way of 
voting, other people, too, must sometimes be entitled to satisfice, rather than maximise, the 
interests that we share.  But that does not bother you overmuch, because you think that it is 
consistent with a commitment to equality and solidarity that we must sometimes satisfice 
rather than maximise our shared goals, in order to accommodate each other’s conscientious 
convictions, even if these are not widely shared. 
Is it morally wrong to vote in the way that I have just described?  If it is wrong, it seems that 
this must be because we have duties to maximise the common good, or to treat our shared 
ends as more important than anything else, at least when it comes to voting.  However, I am 
not sure why we should assume this, even under idealised conditions.   We can agree that our 
shared ends should usually take primacy over other considerations when determining the use 
of collective resources and powers without supposing that they must be the only things that 
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we consider.9 It seems odd, after all, to suppose that it would be better to randomise or to 
abstain when considerations of the common good are not determinate, than to use ethically 
weighty, but not generally shared, considerations to determine our choice amongst electoral 
candidates. But if such weighty but personal considerations can act as a tie-breaker in such 
cases, why suppose that it is morally wrong to attach any weight to them in other cases?  After 
all, the difference between the best and the next best, from the perspective of the common 
good, may not be very great but the difference between them from the perspective of our 
particular concerns may be substantial, perhaps irreparable.  It seems dogmatic to insist that 
it would be morally wrong to vote for the next best in such a case.10 Even where the difference 
between the best and the next best is greater, we can hardly be accused of culpable 
indifference to the freedom and equality of others if the person we deem second best is 
deemed best by some, even many, thoughtful and conscientious citizens. And while it is much 
less clear that we are entitled to satisfice, rather than to optimise if the gap between the 
satisfactory and the best is really quite large, I have suggested that this might sometimes be 
permissible and quite distinct, ethically, from pursuing one’s self-interest at the expense of 
others.11 
The Ethics of Voting and Ideal Theory 
If the arguments we’ve looked at are plausible, the ethics of voting, even in ideal theory, are 
more complicated than we might have supposed, because respect for each other’s moral 
                                                          
9 The language of primacy figures repeatedly in Cohen’s interpretation of Rousseau.  However, this seems to 
be a reflection of Cohen’s interpretive argument that Rousseau seeks the unity of the general will through 
individuals ordering their preferences so that concern for shared ends dominates, rather than supposing that 
citizens have no other ends, as some have thought. There is no suggestion that Rousseau – or, indeed, Cohen - 
think that voters may permissibly vote for anything other than the common good. See Rousseau, 33-40, 54 
where citizens ‘deliberate about conduct by giving first consideration to reasons of the common good’ – which 
might suggest that second and third consideration goes to something else. However, in practice this seems not 
to be the case.  
10 My argument here has affinities with worries about the absolute priority that Rawls gives to improving the 
situation of the worst off social group, once the Equal Basic Liberties and Fair Equality of Opportunity have 
been secured. Such an absolute priority makes sense if the situation of the Worst Off is either very bad or very 
much worse than everyone else.  To the extent that these are not the case, it can seem harder to justify.  
However, granting absolute priority to the worst off social group, on Rawlsian assumptions about the 
relationship between their situation and that of others, means that we do not have to make complex 
interpersonal comparisons in order to know when improvements in people’s wellbeing are justified.  Thus, 
considerations of transparency and solidarity may favour stringent priority rules, even if we’re not sure that 
they are required by fairness, or that economic inequality is justified in order to improve the wellbeing of 
others.   
11 By contrast, Jason Brennan supposes that satisficing rather than maximising cannot be justified, because he 
assumes that ‘if you take on the office of voter, you acquire additional moral responsibilities, just as you would 
were you to become the Federal Reserve Chairman…The electorate decides who governs…They owe it to the 
governed to provide what they justifiably believe or ought to believe is the best governance, just as others 
with political power owe it to the governed to do the same’. Pp. 128-9.  However, the difficulty with this way 
of thinking, is that it treats voting as a special office, rather than a natural exercise of democratic rights, and 
ignores the difference between the power of an individual voter and the power of legislators or Chairmen of 
the Federal Reserve.  For the reasons why this matters, and its significance for arguments against open voting, 
see Annabelle Lever, ‘Mill and the Secret Ballot: Beyond Coercion and Corruption’, Utilitas, 2007, 354–78. 
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capacities does not mean that we must always vote to maximise the legitimate interests 
which we share as citizens.  On the contrary, solidarity can manifest itself through a 
generalised permission to satisfice rather than maximise shared interests on occasion, given 
the ethical dilemmas in voting which conscientious citizens may face.  
One of the difficulties about being a voter, ethically speaking, is that we can only vote on the 
choices before us and, however much we might wish for things to be different, we cannot 
expect there to be so many good candidates – even in ideal theory –that it is easy to decide 
how to vote.  Moreover, as a voter it is generally difficult for us to influence political debate, 
or to reshape existing conceptions of the common good if we come to think that they are 
inadequate.  In short, one of the difficulties about voting ethically is that voters at election-
time are more like price-takers than price-shapers, in that their ability to shape the electoral 
choices before them is now largely set.  We can deliberate publicly on those choices, and try 
to improve them at the margins, but for the most part, once an election is called, town 
meetings and questions to political parties and candidates are better at informing us about 
the choices we face than at enabling us to influence those choices themselves. 
  Nor, it must be said, is it easy for individuals to influence the choices that will be put before 
the electorate without dedicating large amounts of time and energy, over very long periods, 
to the task of influencing the political agenda. This may be possible for most people at some 
moments in their lives, but even for people who care about politics, or who are particularly 
civic-minded, such forms of political engagement may be difficult to sustain and may prove a 
less productive use of time and energy than other forms of political or civic engagement.  
Taken together, these points suggest that the ethics of voting need to consider not only what 
people can do with their vote – at least, as part of an electorally-winning coalition – but also 
what they cannot do.12  The reasons to insist that voters should only vote for the common 
good reflect the important point that elections seek to define a legitimate government, with 
the power to bind citizens morally and politically.  However, once we acknowledge that voters 
do not get to choose the candidates before them, and may have had rather limited 
opportunities to influence the political agenda between elections, it is easy to see why, even 
in ideal theory, voters may face a choice between the candidate that seems best to them 
when they consider only their shared interests as citizens, and the candidate that seems best 
to them when they consider what they should do more generally.   
There are many things which we should do which have no particular relevance to electoral 
ethics.  We can give money to charity, volunteer our time and experience, as well as our 
money; set up associations of different sorts or participate in ones that are already 
established; we can write letters to the press, demonstrate, protest and generally seek to 
advance the ends that strike us as ethically important without feeling obliged to further those 
                                                          
12 Annabelle Lever, ‘Compulsory Voting: A Critical Perspective’, British Journal of Political Science 40, no. 04 
(October 2010): 897–915.  
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ends by voting. However, sometimes politics can promote or impede ends that we think are 
of such importance that we have ethical reasons to vote that we otherwise lacked, and to 
vote one way rather than another. I conclude then that, even in ideal theory, we do not have 
to vote for the common good, or treat our shared interests as citizens as the sole criteria of 
electoral choice. Unfortunately, it is not easy to estimate how often we are permitted to vote 
on other considerations, although there is surely much more that can be said on the matter 
than I can offer here. However, we are likely to confuse reasonable disagreement over the 
best interpretation of the common good with disagreement over the relative weight and 
importance of our common good, as long as we insist that our shared interests are the sole 
legitimate basis for voting.  Such confusion will be particularly problematic in so far as we are 
concerned with the relationship between claims of justice and claims of the common good.   
Thus far, we have assumed that if our conception of the common good reflects principles of 
justice, then we will never face a conflict between claims of justice and claims of the common 
good.  However, it is hard to be confident that this is true, given the reasons for supposing 
that rights are not absolute.13 Even when we try conscientiously to give others their due, and 
are not impeded by injustice from acting, we may be unable to honour the conflicting claims 
upon us.  This is a sufficiently familiar occurrence to suggest that, even in ideal theory, the 
principles of justice we affirm as part of our common good may give us reasons for action 
which are at odds with other principles of justice - of global justice, for instance, or of justice 
to future generations.  In such cases we are faced with a conflict of duties within our shared 
conception of justice – between the principles we affirm as part of our shared ends, and those 
principles which we affirm when we reflect on the claims of others.  
We can describe the moral situation we face in terms of a conflict within our shared 
conception of justice, but we might also describe it as a conflict within our shared conception 
of the good, in so far as a commitment to justice is something that we share.  But we may 
experience, and want to describe our situation as one which pits the claims of justice against 
our common good.  We are particularly likely to describe our situation this way if we believe 
that the conflict we face gives us reasons to subordinate our common good to the just claims 
of those who are not our fellow citizens. If the conflict arises in circumstances consistent with 
ideal theory – being the result of misfortune rather than injustice - we will have no good 
reason to revise our conceptions of the good or the just, but will, rather, have to decide on 
the priority to give our different duties, based on the conceptions of goodness and justice that 
we currently have.  In short, even in ideal theory it is reasonable sometimes to believe that 
we should vote on considerations of justice rather than of the common good.  
Conclusion 
                                                          
13 Jeremy Waldron, Liberal Rights: Collected Papers 1981–1991 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1993).especially the discussion of Nozick’s conception of rights in chapters 1 and 2.  For other objections to 
Nozick on rights, see Jonathan Wolff Jonathan Wolff, Robert Nozick: Property, Justice and the Minimal State 
(London: Polity Press, 1991). 
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It is hard to know how different our circumstances as democratic citizens are from the world 
assumed by ideal theory.  If we are fortunate, we can assume that we have a shared interest 
in justice with our fellow citizens even if we find it hard to agree on the principles that define 
that interest, or to act upon them as we could or should.14 It is plausible, however, that we 
will face more occasions than in the circumstances of ideal theory when our best 
understanding of the common good is not precise enough to determine how we should vote. 
There are likely more circumstances when it will seem ethically compelling to satisfice, rather 
than to maximise the common good, in part because we may be concerned with determining 
which is the ‘least bad’ option of the ones we face, rather than trying to evaluate which of 
several appealing options to choose given uncertainties about our knowledge, or about the 
likely consequences of different policies.  Above all, we will likely face many more 
circumstances where justice will be a constraint on our common good, rather than an 
expression of it.15 Democratic citizens in non-ideal states, then, may face many of the same 
dilemmas as their counterparts in ideal theory and, like the latter, may feel unsure how to 
describe or evaluate the demands upon them.  Ideal theory suggests that such doubts are 
often reasonable, and admit of no easy resolution, because even in the world of ideal theory, 
we do not always have to vote for the common good.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
14 For a particularly interesting analysis see Joshua Cohen and Charles Sabel ‘deliberative polyarchy’, section 3, 
with its claim that institutional failure, at present, makes it unnecessarily hard for citizens to agree on solutions 
to collective problems ‘…we assume that for some substantial range of current problems, citizens agree 
sufficiently much about the urgency of the problems and the broad desiderata on solutions that, had they the 
means to translate this general agreement into a more concrete, practical program, they would improve their 
common situation, and possibly discover further arenas of cooperation.  This Is not to make the foolish claim 
that everyone endorses the same ranking of solutions, only that they prefer a wide range of alternatives to the 
status quo’.  
15 Annabelle Lever, ‘Mill and the Secret Ballot’, 375-6. 
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